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Article 5

TRIBUTE

DAVID TRAGER: JURIST
Jeffrey Brandon Morris†
Earlier this year, the federal judiciary and the City of
New York lost an able judge and one of the city’s most publicspirited citizens. As a former United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of New York, Judge David G. Trager took over
what historically had been a patronage-driven office and
transformed it into one that is highly professional and motivated
to strike political corruption.1 As dean of Brooklyn Law School
for over a decade, Trager was the central figure in transforming
that institution from a local to national law school.2
While I have written elsewhere about the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, as well as
its judges, I cannot pretend to be completely objective in this
essay, although I have attempted to be. I was a Visiting
Professor at Brooklyn Law School during David Trager’s
deanship, and he left an indelible imprint on my career as a
teacher and scholar. As dean, David Trager was a memorable
personality. Large in size, he dominated any room he walked
into by the strength of his personality. He propelled Brooklyn
Law School forward with his vision—and with his ability to take
the law school in new directions by anticipating and overcoming
opposition through negotiation. In the end, much of his success
can be attributed to the fact that he was able to persuade others
that his motivation was truly not personal aggrandizement, but
rather the improvement of the institution.3

†

Professor of Law, Touro Law School.
See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982).
2
JEFFREY BRANDON MORRIS, BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS 151-69 (2001).
3
Id.
1
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When he was dean, David Trager, often without being
asked, was of enormous assistance to the careers of others.
When the recipient of such gratuitous assistance attempted to
express his or her appreciation, it tended to be received with
what can only be described as an “embarrassed growl.”
The demands upon a federal district judge are very
different from those of a dean. While far too early to attempt a
definitive assessment of Trager’s seventeen-year career from
1993 to 2011 as a district judge, one could at this point make a
few observations about his work.
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York
that Trager joined in 1994 was already a distinguished court.
Although it had lost men of John F. Dooling, Jr., and Orrin G.
Judd’s quality, the court already included judges of superb
caliber—Jacob Mishler, Jack B. Weinstein, and Eugene
Nickerson, to name but a few. The jurisdiction of the district
provided a rich docket: drug arrests were made at its airports;
notorious organized crimes were committed within its five
counties; lawsuits were frequently launched against its
government; and complex commercial disputes were spawned
in its boroughs. The government of the City of New York was
an obvious target for lawsuits. Environmental actions in
Nassau and Suffolk Counties, and copyright, trademark, and
civil rights litigation were common.4 Trager had his share of
these cases and much else.
I.

TRAGER AND THE “CLASSIC” FEDERAL SPECIALTIES

The old specialties of the federal courts were well
represented on the Eastern District’s docket and on Trager’s.
Among those specialties were admiralty, bankruptcy, and
criminal cases. Judge Trager had no “blockbuster” cases in these
areas, but a brief discussion of the kinds of cases he adjudicated
helps to remind us of the work federal judges have done and do.
A.

Admiralty

Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was a major reason
for the creation of the federal district courts in 1789.5 After
4

See JEFFREY B. MORRIS, TO ADMINISTER JUSTICE ON BEHALF OF ALL THE
PEOPLE: THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW
YORK 1965-1990, at 34 (1992).
5
Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73. See, e.g., JEFFREY B. MORRIS,
FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 7 (1987).
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Congress established the Eastern District of New York in 1865,
the New York ports brought interesting and important
questions arising out of collisions, groundings, and sinking of
vessels, as well as suits brought by sailors and longshoremen
for wages and physical injuries, to the federal courts.
While admiralty and maritime cases have declined in
number—mirroring the decline of water shipping more
generally—cases involving vessels, sailors, and longshoremen
are still found in the work of the district courts.6 In spite of
resemblances to the laws of torts and workers’ compensation,
admiralty and maritime law evoke a world and vocabulary of
their own. Judge Trager was no stranger to the lingo:
The vessel contained four cargo holds (or hatches) with each hatch
containing two levels—a tweendeck (upper cargo storage area) and a
lower hold. . . .
Attached to the fore and front walls of each hold is a ladder leading
up from the tweendeck to the main deck. About one meter to the left
or the right of the tweendeck ladder, in the floor of the tweendeck, is
an access door (or escape hatch). The access door cover can be lifted
up by hand and opens toward the wall where it can be fastened to
the wall to keep the access door open . . . .7

Under
the
Longshore
and
Harbor
Workers
Compensation Act, a comprehensive federal workers’
compensation program, “[the] injured longshoreman is entitled
to . . . benefits regardless of fault,” but “[t]he injured
longshoreman’s
employer,”
usually
an
“independent
stevedore . . . is shielded from any further liability.”8 But if the
injury was caused by the negligence of a vessel, the
longshoreman can sue the vessel’s owner.9
Trager was quite sympathetic to seamen. In McMillan
v. Tug Jane A. Bouchard,10 Judge Trager considered the law of
maintenance and cure11 when a seaman claimed injury to his

6

MORRIS, supra note 4, at 7, 19.
Fernandez v. China Ocean Shipping (Grp.) Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 369, 371
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
8
Conenna v. Loyal Chartering Corp., No. CV 98-7402, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1545, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2003) (quoting Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co.,
S.A., 512 U.S. 92, 96 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9
Id. at *10-11 (citation omitted).
10
885 F. Supp. 452 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
11
Dating back to at least the twelfth century, the law of maintenance and cure
makes the ship owner responsible for paying maintenance and cure following any injury
or sickness incurred by a seaman while in the owner’s employ, whatever the cause.
7
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back caused by lifting a shackle and line on the tug. As a
result, the plaintiff missed some work. The defendant claimed
that McMillan had an undisclosed, pre-existing back injury.
His prior medical history also indicated neck and shoulder
injuries and a history of valium use to control muscle spasms.
Furthermore, rumor circulated that McMillan sought
replacement on an upcoming fourteen-day hitch. When that
request was turned down, McMillan said something equivalent
to, “One way or another I am getting off the boat.”12
Yet, employing a Court of Appeals decision favorable to
the seaman plaintiff,13 Trager held that McMillan had a good-faith
basis for withholding the information because McMillan missed
only five days of work in 1976 and did not regularly use valium
for his back injury.14 At worst, Trager wrote, McMillan’s belief was
“an honest failure to reveal a prior medical condition.”15 Trager
also indicated in a footnote that “it would be reaching to conclude
from [McMillan’s] statement that some months earlier he had
fraudulently concealed his pre-existing medical conditions.”16
In the end, all doubts were resolved in favor of the
seaman. As a result, Trager held that the defendant had
terminated McMillan’s maintenance and cure too early. Even
though McMillan stayed, rent-free, with family and friends
during his recuperation, Trager did not deduct from McMillan’s
judgment any savings or earnings accrued while off work (for
McMillan had no other way of supporting himself).17 Trager
held, “[A] shipowner cannot escape its liability for maintenance
by forcing an injured seaman to involuntarily seek the financial
support of family and friends during his or her convalescence.”18
But Trager did not award punitive damages and attorneys’ fees
because the owner’s conduct was neither callous nor

“Maintenance” is the sum of money sufficient to provide food and lodging for
the injured seaman during his or her convalescence and until he or she
reaches the point of maximum medical cure. . . . “Cure” consists of payments
for all aspects of the seaman’s medical care until he or she reaches maximum
medical cure.
Id. at 459 (citations omitted).
12
Id. at 456.
13
Sammon v. Cent. Gulf S.S. Corp., 442 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1971).
14
McMillan v. Tug Jane A. Bouchard, 885 F. Supp. 452, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
15
Id. at 461.
16
Id. at 461 n.11.
17
Id. at 465-66.
18
Id. at 465.
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recalcitrant.19 The owner had made an erroneous decision, but
one that had a “good faith basis.”20
B.

Bankruptcy

The federal courts’ involvement in bankruptcies dates
back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. The
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 198421
established the bankruptcy court as a unit of the district court;
accordingly, the district court refers bankruptcy cases and
proceedings to the bankruptcy court.
Trager handled a number of bankruptcy matters. In
one, he gave short shrift to the debtor’s filing because the
debtor failed to abide by the bankruptcy court’s repeated
orders—first, to make adequate post-petition mortgage
payments, and second, to comply with rental obligations. Also,
the debtor could not propose a satisfactory repayment plan.22 In
another case, Trager held against non-lawyer, fly-by-night
bankruptcy preparers who engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law and violated the bankruptcy law provision
prohibiting fraudulent, unfair, or defective acts.23
C.

Criminal Cases

Considering Trager’s distinguished career as a U.S.
Attorney, it could have been anticipated that he would make a
mark as a judge in the field of criminal law. There was no
question of Trager’s interest, ability, and comfort in the field.
In turn, his opinions made the factual implications and legal
stakes of each case clear. To reach these decisions, Trager used
his ability to discern the tactics and strategies of attorneys.24
Like his colleagues, Judge Trager heard many habeas
corpus petitions from state prisoners. Generally, he denied these
petitions with relatively brief opinions. Although usually cloaked
19

Id. at 466-67, 469.
Id. at 467.
21
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
22
In re Watkins, Civ.A. No. CV-05-4271, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44754
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2005); see also In re Watkins, 362 B.R. 568, 574 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
23
See In re Tomlinson, 343 B.R. 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(h)(5)(i)(1) (2006).
24
Trager did not have many organized crime and political corruption cases as
a judge. But see Russo v. United States, No. 04-CV-3871, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62209
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2007).
20
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in a theory of ineffectiveness of counsel, the issues varied in
habeas petitions brought before him. Judge Trager considered
petitions concerning whether there was sufficient evidence to
support the essential elements of a conviction;25 whether a lineup was too suggestive;26 and whether a petitioner’s challenge
rested on procedural or substantive grounds.27
Trager’s ability to study a criminal case, determine its
strengths and weaknesses from the point of view of both sides,
and foresee and assess the tactics of the attorneys allowed him to
decide more authoritatively than most judges. Vaknin v. United
States28 is an excellent example. Vaknin was an action to vacate a
sentence and conviction.29 The case dealt with a complex criminal
scheme that involved obtaining commissions from a wireless
carrier through the sale of customer information.30 The defendants
used the information to fraudulently renew customer contracts
and buy and sell wireless phones. Vaknin sought reversal because
the government failed to disclose evidence favorable to the
defendant under Brady v. Maryland31—specifically, that Vaknin
was not aware of the sale of customer information.32 In assessing
the motion to vacate defendant Vaknin’s sentence, Trager ruled
that the government’s failure to disclose was not reversible error
because the information would have simply confirmed what
Vaknin already knew.33 Then, in dealing with the ineffectiveness
of counsel claim, Trager demonstrated that there was no
reasonable probability of Vaknin’s case proceeding to trial: no
competent counsel would have pursued that theory even if
Vaknin’s acquittal had been a possibility.34
Trager’s effectiveness in handling facts is also evinced
in an opinion he penned when he sat by designation on the
25

Loving v. People, No. CV-04-1284, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45026 (E.D.N.Y.
June 21, 2007).
26
Brinson v. Annetts, No. CV-05-5582, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76388
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2008).
27
Mateo v. Fishkill Corr. Facility, No. CV-04-3420, 2007 WL 2362205
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2007). Similar to the state habeas petitions, and usually brought pro
se, were 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions to alter federal sentences. Birkett v. United States,
No. CV-97-1526, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34785 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2008).
28
No. 08-CV-02420, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86254 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2010).
29
Id. at *1.
30
Id. at *5-9.
31
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
32
Vaknin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86254, at *41-42.
33
Id.
34
Even if this theory proved successful, the defendant’s sentence would not
have been mitigated. See id. at *53-54.
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Eleventh Circuit.35 The defendant, Richardson, had been
convicted of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine.36 He argued that the evidence presented at trial had
not proved a single overarching conspiracy but rather the
existence of multiple distinct conspiracies for which he had not
been charged.37 Writing for a panel, Trager lucidly and
compellingly marshaled the evidence against Richardson,
demolishing the theories raised by his defense. Richardson
was, Trager wrote, “a ‘key man’ [who] direct[ed] and
coordinate[d] the activities and individual efforts of various
combinations of people.”38 Richardson “was not a spoke, but the
hub of all the conspiratorial acts the government sought to
prove at trial.”39 Judge Trager’s language is telling: this was not
the kind of case where the government sought to convict a
defendant who played a peripheral role in a vast conspiracy.
Thus, the court, affirming the conviction, held that the
government presented evidence sufficient to establish the
common goal, underlying scheme, and overlap of participants.40
The evidence supported a reasonable conclusion that each coconspirator worked with Richardson according to Richardson’s
grand scheme. Trager’s ability to work with doctrine in
criminal cases was also on display in Rivera v. Artus, a habeas
case. In two footnotes, Judge Trager analyzed two lines of court
of appeals decisions involving the suppression of statements
made to police concerning both an unrepresented and a
represented matter in the course of the same interrogation.41
Trager also wrote several interesting opinions in criminal
cases for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. United
States v. Paopao,42 for instance, posed the issue of a protective
sweep. A police detective received a tip from a confidential
informant that several suspected robbers of illegal gambling
rooms were in a particular room in Honolulu.43 Arriving at the
site and making an arrest, the officers performed a protective
35

United States v. Richardson, 532 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir.), reh’g en banc
denied, 285 F. App’x 745 (11th Cir. 2008).
36
Id. at 1282.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 1286 (quoting United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1347 (11th
Cir. 2007)).
39
Id. at 1288.
40
Id. at 1285-86.
41
No. CV-04-5050, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79345 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2007).
42
469 F.3d 760 (9th Cir. 2006).
43
Id. at 763.
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sweep that took less than a minute.44 As the officers were leaving
the apartment, one of them noticed an unzipped bag.45 Looking
into the bag, one of the officers saw what he thought was the
handle of a handgun and ammunition.46 He seized the bag, and
the contents were later determined to be a gun, ammunition, a
knife, and a black pouch of jewels.47
Writing for the court, Trager held that the defendant,
Paopao, personally had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the game room and, therefore, had no standing to challenge the
protective sweep.48 Indeed, if the judge ruled that Paopao had
standing, the search would still have been held valid because
the police had reasonable suspicion from the informant’s tip.49
While Paopao could contest the seizure of his bag, the search of
an object in plain view is constitutional.
In another Ninth Circuit criminal case for which Trager
wrote the opinion, the panel affirmed the conviction of a thirtyfive-year-old man who had attempted to persuade and entice a
minor—an undercover FBI agent in an online chat room—to
engage in sexual acts.50 The court held that the trial court had
acted within its discretion in admitting evidence tending to
prove the defendant’s intent and modus operandi.51 Specifically,
the trial court allowed evidence of the defendant’s previous
conviction for lewdness with two children, aged eleven and
twelve, as well as evidence of complaints of similar behavior that
had been made to America Online.52 Judge Trager held that its
prejudicial impact was outweighed by its probative value.53
44

Id.
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 764-65.
49
Id. at 765-67.
50
United States v. Cherer, 513 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008).
51
Id. at 1157.
52
Id. at 1156.
53
Id. at 1159. However, the distinguished philosopher-judge John Noonan
disagreed with the sentence of almost twenty-four years in prison, which the court
affirmed. The panel affirmed the sentence, finding that the trial judge had made no
significant procedural error. In response to Judge Noonan’s criticism, the panel opined
on the district court’s reasonableness “to conclude that a lengthy prison sentence was
necessary to protect the public.” Id. at 1160. Further, the panel held that the trial
judge “was not required to consider the much more lenient sentences available for
other violent and arguably more heinous sex offenses.” Id. at 1161. Judge Noonan
argued that the defendant’s crime was “committed by words in the imaginary world of
the chat room.” Id. at 1162. In words reminiscent of Trager’s colleague Jack B.
Weinstein, see, e.g., United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2008),
Noonan wrote: “The defendant is not a convenient abstraction such as ‘a pedophile’ but
45
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Pro Se Cases

There are few federal judges who enjoy litigation brought
pro se. There is no evidence that David Trager was such a judge.
However, in only a few cases did he show exasperation.54 One
such case seems to have begun when the pro se plaintiff
allegedly forced his way into a sixteen-year-old tenant’s home,
which he owned.55 He was convicted of a misdemeanor, and he
and his wife then filed a complaint, which was subsequently
withdrawn. An amended complaint was then filed naming the
original defendants—a state judge, Kings County District
Attorney Charles Hynes, and two assistant district attorneys—
along with the New York City Department of Corrections, Rent
Guidelines Board, and Police Department, as well as the
Criminal Court of Kings County and five other governmental
offices.56 The plaintiff, George Pappanikolaou, alleged a
conspiracy to convict him by tampering with the evidence.57 He
also alleged abuse and discrimination claims against the Police
Department, Department of Corrections, and the Rent
Guidelines Board.58 Other deprivations were alleged in the
thirty-one page complaint, which Trager described as “a lengthy
narrative which rambled about conspiracy theories.”59
Judge Jack Weinstein, among the most tolerant judges
in dealing with pro se litigants,60 had dismissed the complaint.61
a human being who cannot be so summarily categorized. It may take the sentencing
judge effort and empathy to address the person before him. The judge has no choice if
he is to follow the law.” Cherer, 513 F.3d at 1162.
54
One such case was brought by a homeless New Yorker who sought five
hundred million dollars as well as other relief, though that was expressed incoherently.
Belton v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-2937, 2005 WL 2133593 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1,
2005). The plaintiff was suing for five hundred million dollars because, he claimed, the
New York City Transit Police at the Clark Street subway station (near to the main
courthouse of the Eastern District) had “failed to keepsake his belongings” when he
was arrested. Id. at *1. The five hundred million dollars of missing possessions was for
an emergency crisis kit, one fifty dollar special comforter, and two twin size blankets.
Id. at *2. Trager construed the complaint as a section 1983 action for deprivation of
property without due process of law, but dismissed it because of the lack of any official
police policy or custom. He did, though, point the plaintiff to state law causes of action
for negligence, replevin, and conversion. Id. at *3.
55
Pappanikolaou v. New York City, No. CV-01-865, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
39201, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2005).
56
Id. at *3.
57
Id. at *3-4.
58
Id.
59
Id. at *4.
60
See, e.g., JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL BENCH: THE
CRAFT AND ACTIVISM OF JACK WEINSTEIN 24, 61-62 (2011).
61
Pappanikolaou, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39201, at *5-6.
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But the Second Circuit reversed to the extent that there were
claims against the New York City defendants for deliberate
indifference to the plaintiff’s medical needs and that there were
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act.62 Weinstein
then recused himself from the case, but the plaintiff’s extensive
litigation continued.
After a conference before a magistrate judge,
Pappanikolaou filed a 118-page complaint which dealt largely
with his arrest, incarceration, and prosecution, although the
Second Circuit and the magistrate judge had already indicated
that these issues were off limits.63 The plaintiff then filed a
third complaint, described by Judge Trager as “a fifty-nine
page, single-spaced document that was yet again filled with the
same rambling and incomprehensible allegations that were
present in the first two amended complaints.”64 This was
followed by the fifth status conference, which, in turn, was
followed by an order containing explicit instructions concerning
how the complaint should be properly amended.65 Consequently,
the plaintiff filed his fourth complaint.66 It was forty-three pages
long and named numerous new defendants (among them, the
New York Governor George E. Pataki, State Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer and Chief Judge Judith Kaye).67 Despite the
magistrate’s instructions, the plaintiff continued to allege that
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had already
dismissed the case. Trager said that the new complaint
“nonsensically ramble[d].”68 When the City and State moved to
dismiss, the plaintiffs filed a 229-page opposition.69
Yet, even after all this, Trager was unwilling to dismiss the
case for failure to comply with a court order or for failure to comply
with the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
10(b).70 Trager did, however, dismiss for failure to comply with
Rule 8’s “short and plain statement” of claims requirement. The
plaintiff had otherwise failed to state a valid claim for relief under
section 1983, the Civil Rights statute, or the Americans with
Disabilities Act. The dismissal was without leave to amend.
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *10, *12 n.2.
Id. at *22.
Id. at *13 & n.3.
Id. at *15-17, *26-28.
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There was also the action brought by Israel Valle, who,
in 2004, Trager enjoined from filing any new action “seeking in
forma pauperis status without obtaining leave of court.”71 Valle
sought leave to file five actions in 2002, two in 2006, nine in
2008, and four in 2009.72 In 2010, Valle filed three more actions
alleging in the first two that numerous state court judges were
involved in a criminal enterprise.73 In the third action, he sued
district judges, a U.S. magistrate judge, the clerk of the court,
and various other court personnel.74 Judge Trager, one of the
named defendants, noted that—as in prior attempts—he would
not recuse himself, “as there [was] no basis to do so and it would
only [have] provide[d] Valle with another person to sue should
[the] case [have been] reassigned to another district judge.”75 He
added: “In essence, Valle has formulated a template that he
repackages with a different caption depending on which court
has dismissed his latest attempts to file frivolous litigation.”76 As
an order to show cause for sanctions was pending, Judge Trager
simply denied leave to file the three actions and certified that
any appeal of his order would not be in good faith.77
Trager had a special connection to another pro se case,
Leeds v. Meltz.78 In Leeds, the plaintiff was an attorney, an
alumnus of the City University of New York School of Law.79
Leeds sued the acting dean of CUNY School of Law and three
student editors of the school’s student newspaper because the
newspaper had refused to publish a classified advertisement in
which Leeds sought material to discredit faculty and
administrators for a civil rights action against the school.80 Leeds
claimed that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had
been violated by the editors’ refusal to publish the ad; the
plaintiff argued that the student editors were acting under color
of state law and were thus violating his constitutional rights.81
Trager had no doubt that the student editors were not
state actors. And in fact, Leeds’s argument—reliant upon an
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

In re Valle, No. MC-10-0033, 2010 WL 364355 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2010).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
898 F. Supp. 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 147-48.
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inference that the editors’ decision was influenced by the public
school’s administration—was undermined by Leeds’s own
complaint, which alleged that “the administration retaliated
against the paper by cutting its budget and access to facilities.”82
The fact that a publication is sponsored by a state agency, by
itself, is insufficient to establish state action.83 The newspaper at
issue was sufficiently independent, and its actions could not be
characterized as state action.84 Indeed, Leeds had “alleged no facts
from which it could plausibly be inferred that the editors’ actions
were ‘fairly attributable’ to the law school administration.”85
Former Dean Trager pointed out that it was “difficult to
believe that all three student editors would have supinely
accepted
the
alleged
intimidation
of
the
school
administration.”86 “[S]tudents being students, more than likely
they would have at least complained to some of their student
colleagues about the administration or faculty pressure and the
issue, in the natural course of events, would inevitably have
become a subject of student discussion at the law school.”87
The Leeds opinion also rested on a broad principle: “As
most student publications are generally without substantial
resources, baseless actions can impair the First Amendment
rights of the publications and their student participants.”88
Further, if complaints could be sustained “on the flimsy basis
present here,” students “would be unwilling to run the risk of
having to pay substantial legal fees to defend themselves from
unjustified legal actions and would forego the opportunity to
participate in this activity.”89
82

Id. at 148.
Id. at 148-49.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 149 (citations omitted).
86
Id. at 150.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 149.
89
Id. at 149-50. In Wasser v. New York State Office of Vocational &
Educational Services, Trager dealt with a lawsuit brought by a Brooklyn Law School
graduate, a quadriplegic suing pro se a New York State agency which provides services
to those with disabilities (VESID). 683 F. Supp. 2d 201, 203-04 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d,
602 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2010). The relationship between Wasser and VESID had “been
contentious from the start.” Id. at 204. VESID had reimbursed Wasser for part of his
legal education at Brooklyn Law School, but only up to the cost he would have had if he
had gone to CUNY Law School, which was much less than at Brooklyn. Id. at 219.
Wasser argued that the one law school sponsored by the state, the State University of
New York at Buffalo Law School, and CUNY were inappropriate for him because of his
disability and his career goals. Id. at 220. Wasser had actually begun law school while
Trager was still dean and he cited the “receptive atmosphere” at Brooklyn Law School.
Trager ruled against Wasser on this claim (indeed, on all his claims). Id. at 220, 225.
83
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Trager’s Decisions While Sitting with Courts of Appeal

The custom of designating district judges to sit with
courts of appeal for short periods of time not only acclimatizes
district judges to the different concerns of appellate judges, but
it allows district judges the luxury to focus on more specific
issues of law than they would normally be allowed.90 David
Trager sat by designation on the Courts of Appeals for the
Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. Appellate work was an
important part of his legacy.91
Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, Ltd.92 was an Eleventh
Circuit case which raised difficult conflict-of-law issues.
Following settlement of a ship captain’s maritime tort action
for injuries he sustained as a result of an alleged defective ship
food lift, a number of parties filed third-party complaints
seeking to receive indemnity and contribution from the ship’s
builder and designer and from an associated U.S. venture.93 The
ship, the Meduse, was built in the Netherlands and registered
in the Cayman Islands.94 The shipbuilder and ship designer
principally operated in the Netherlands, but conducted
business in the U.S in a joint venture. The ship’s purchaser
was a business entity organized under the laws of the British
Virgin Islands, and the captain was employed by a British
Virgin Islands corporation. The ship’s management company
(Vulcan Manager) and crew were incorporated in the State of

He stated that Wasser had not shown that Brooklyn Law School “offered supportive
services that were unavailable at a public law school.” Id. at 220. He stated that
“Wasser’s belief that CUNY School of Law was academically inferior does not require
VESID to waive its otherwise valid policy. CUNY School of Law is located in
reasonable proximity to his home. It was fully accredited . . . . Graduates of CUNY are
employed in a wide variety of settings . . . .” Id. While it was “within Wasser’s
discretion to choose to attend a private law school, it was also appropriate for VESID to
reimburse tuition rates only up to the cost of a public institution.” Id.
90
For many years Congress provided that, where the constitutionality of
federal statutes was at issue (and when certain other issues were involved), there was
to be review by a three-judge district court constituted by the Chief Judge of the
Circuit. The three-judge courts were usually made up of two district judges and one
court of appeals judge. Gradually, that jurisdiction has been eliminated. See Act of
February 11, 1903, ch. 544, 32 Stat. 823; Elliot S. Marks & Alan H. Schoem, The
Applicability of Three-Judge Federal Courts in Contemporary Law: A Viable Legal
Procedure or a Legal Horsecart in a Jet Age?, 21 AM. U. L. REV. 417, 429 (1972).
91
Several of Judge Trager’s circuit court of appeals’ opinions are discussed
elsewhere in this essay.
92
575 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2009).
93
Id. at 1157.
94
Id. at 1158-59.
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Washington.95 The entity that constructed the yacht allegedly
operated in the United States.
The district judge had dismissed the third-party
plaintiffs’ claims using the Dutch Statute of Repose.96 As
interpreted by the Eleventh Circuit, however, the case had two
sets of issues raising distinct choice-of-law concerns over the
third-party claims: one set of issues concerned a Dutch choiceof-law clause and Dutch limitation-of-liability provision; the
second set of issues involved whether Dutch law, federal
maritime law, or a third jurisdiction’s law governed the thirdparty claims. In his opinion, Trager indicated that the district
court had been hampered by limited information about Dutch
law and was completely uninformed as to the laws of the
Cayman and British Virgin Islands.
This is not the place to trace the contours of Trager’s
twenty-nine page opinion, which deals with, at least as
calculated by this author, eleven issues and subissues. The
opinion applies three different sets of law in different places:
Dutch law, federal maritime law, and Florida law. The district
judge, who apparently had not considered all the aspects of this
complex puzzle, was affirmed in part and reversed in part.97
Trager’s opinion on the choice-of-law and conflict-of-laws issues
suggests not only how comfortable he was in this arcane area,
but also how much he enjoyed it.98
Trager also wrote for the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in an interesting civil rights suit, Young Apartments,
Inc. v. Town of Jupiter.99 The case involved section 1983 and
breach-of-contract claims brought by the owner of an
apartment complex.100 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants,
a town and town official, had harassed and discriminated
against him and other Hispanics by refusing to provide them
affordable housing.101 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the
95

Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1161.
97
Id. at 1180.
98
Trager handled an unusual number of conflict-of-laws and forum non
conveniens issues. See, e.g., Giaguaro v. Amiglio, 257 F. Supp. 2d 529 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(a complicated dispute over the sale of Italian canned, peeled tomatoes); see also
Gerena v. Korb, 617 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2010) (where Trager wrote the opinion for the
Second Circuit in a case involving a civil suit brought by a Yale student who claimed
she was sexually assaulted in her dormitory room by another Yale student after a Yale
sponsored back-to-school event).
99
529 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir. 2008).
100
Id. at 1032.
101
Id.
96
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town had adopted an overcrowding ordinance in response to the
increasing number of immigrant workers.102 The ordinance was
purportedly enforced through “excessive and selective” housing
inspections that targeted landlords housing Hispanics.103 The town
inspected the plaintiff’s apartment complex and cited it for
violations of the ordinance as well as physical defects on the
property.104 The town condemned some units in the building which
led to the cancellation of the contract to sell the building.105
The district court dismissed most of Young’s complaint.
The appeal centered on the holding that Young lacked standing
to bring a race-based discrimination suit as well as the
dismissal of the complaint against two town officials. The court
of appeals reversed on the standing issue because Young
Apartments had suffered financial injuries.106 That is, “Young
could allege that it was injured by Jupiter’s discriminatory
actions regardless of whether such claims might also vindicate
the rights of its immigrant tenants.”107 Nor was Young barred
by prudential principles of third-party standing from
advocating on behalf of its customers against discriminatory
actions that interfered with a business relationship. Indeed,
“Young Apartments [was] uniquely positioned to assert claims
on behalf of its Hispanic residents.”108 The court of appeals also
reversed as to the proper level of review. The trial judge had
used a rational basis test. However, “because Young
Apartments [had] standing to attack the ordinance as racially
discriminatory,” the proper test was strict scrutiny.109 The trial
judge was affirmed in part and the case was remanded.
A third opinion Trager penned for the Eleventh Circuit
also deserves mention. In Hanley v. Roy, Judge Trager
encountered the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction.110 Grandparents from Ireland,
the Hanleys—who had been named testamentary guardians of
their daughter’s children—argued that their son-in-law (Roy)
had wrongfully removed their grandchildren to Florida.111 The
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id. at 1033.
Id.
Id. at 1035.
Id.
Id. at 1038-39.
Id. at 1040.
Id. at 1044.
Id.
485 F.3d 641 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 643.
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district court dismissed the petition.112 The court of appeals,
with Trager writing, reversed.
After their then-divorced daughter had been diagnosed
with cancer, the Hanleys bought her a house in Ireland and
moved in to help care for her children; Roy also moved into the
house.113 Before her death, the daughter named her parents the
testamentary guardians of the children.114 Roy and the children
continued to live with the Hanleys for four-and-one-half years
after the children’s mother died. Then he “suddenly moved the
children from Ireland to Florida without the Hanley’s
knowledge or consent, leaving only a note behind.”115
The court of appeals held that under Irish law,
“testamentary guardians” must act jointly with the father as
guardians. If the father objects, the testamentary guardians
are entitled to “seek a court determination enforcing their
joint-guardianship rights.”116 The district court held that the
status of testamentary guardians was not enough to accord the
Hanley’s “rights of custody” under the Hague Convention and
under the interpretation of the Convention by Irish courts.117
The grandparents were therefore entitled to seek a court
determination enforcing their joint guardianship rights. The
court of appeals then struck at the heart of the case:
“[P]ermitting the very act which the Convention seeks to
prevent—namely, flight—to constitute a construction to
terminate the Hanley’s ‘rights of custody’ would make a
mockery of the Convention.”118 The court of appeals directly
ordered Roy to return the minor children to Ireland for proper
proceedings, and, if he did not do so promptly, the district court
was to order the minor children turned over to the Hanleys.119
Judge Trager’s opinions while sitting by designation on the
courts of appeals suggest that he would have been comfortable
and well qualified to sit fulltime as an appellate judge.

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 644.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 644.
Id.
Id. at 645-46.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 650.
Id.
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AREAS OF LAW WHERE JUDGE TRAGER MADE SPECIAL
CONTRIBUTIONS

As judge, David Trager made significant contributions
in two classic specialties of the federal courts—antitrust and
copyright. He also handled two cases of broad interest—one
relating to the events of September 11, 2001, the other an
unusual criminal case involving terrorism, which deserves
separate treatment.
A.

Antitrust

Trager handled two important antitrust cases—one case
involving the widely used antibiotic Cipro and another against
Chinese manufacturers of Vitamin C. In the Cipro litigation,
Trager supported the longstanding position of the pharmaceutical
industry that settlement of suits between generic and branded
pharmaceutical companies is not presumptively anticompetitive.
At issue was a patent holder’s reverse payment to generic-drug
manufacturers to avoid a patent challenge.120
In Cipro, Barr Laboratories and the Rugby Group
challenged as anticompetitive agreements between Bayer AG,
its American subsidiary, Bayer Corporation (the brand
manufacturer of Cipro), and a group of generic manufacturers.
Barr argued that the agreements, which were lawsuit
settlements, violated antitrust law under the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (HatchWaxman Act).121 In 1991, Barr filed a certification for generic
Cipro claiming Bayer’s patent was invalid. In response, Bayer
sued for infringement. The suit stayed approval of generic
Cipro by the Food and Drug Administration for thirty months.
Bayer and Barr ultimately settled their dispute to avert a
costly trial. Under the settlement, Barr and Rugby
acknowledged the validity of the Cipro patent, and Barr agreed
to amend its certification so that it could market generic Cipro
only after Bayer’s patent expired. For its part, Bayer agreed to,
among other things, license Barr and Rugby to market a
competing ciprofloxacin product six months before the Bayer

120

See In re Tamoxifen, 277 F. Supp. 2d 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).
121
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, § 102, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006)).
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patent’s expiration.122 The agreement spawned multiple
putative class actions in various state courts that were
removed to federal court. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation transferred those cases to Trager, who remanded
some of them back to state courts and retained others with
institutional plaintiffs.123
On May 20, 2003, Trager ruled that the Cipro
settlement did not violate the antitrust laws. He noted that the
challenged settlements resolved the entire patent dispute
without creating a “bottle neck” for subsequent generics. The
real question for antitrust purposes was whether the
settlement would hinder lawful competition.124 Trager stressed
that the American legal process encourages the settlement of
lawsuits. A contrary rule might lead, he said, to less
investment in research and development. He therefore denied
the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment.
In 2005, Trager rendered judgment for the defendants
on similar grounds.125 He held that it would be “inappropriate
for an antitrust court, in determining the reasonableness of a
patent settlement agreement to conduct an after-the-fact
inquiry into the validity of the underlying patent. Such an
inquiry would undermine any certainty for patent litigants
seeking to settle their disputes.”126 Thus, Trager held, the
settlement had not violated the antitrust laws because the
settlement excluded no competition beyond the exclusionary
scope of the patent. The appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit was transferred to the Federal Circuit, which in
2008 affirmed Trager’s position.127
The second of the antitrust cases possessed significant
international implications. The Vitamin C antitrust action was
122

Pamela J. Auerbach & Christopher M. Grengs, Recent District Court Rulings
Support Brand-Name Drugmakers, Generic Counterparts, 1 PHARM. L. & INDUST. REP. 666
(2003), available at http://bna.com/piln/display/batch_print_display.adp.
123
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 740,
756-57 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
124
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
125
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
126
Id. at 530.
127
In re Ciprofloxacin Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
The Second Circuit also backed Trager, although the panel invited the appellants to
petition for rehearing en banc. The full court proved not to be interested. Ark.
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir.), reh’g en banc
denied, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011).
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notable because the Chinese government presented its views as
an amicus.128 The multidistrict litigation consisted of separate
class action suits brought by American individuals and entities
that had purchased Vitamin C from Chinese manufacturers.
The plaintiffs alleged that Chinese companies had met with the
Association of Importer and Exporters of Medicines and Health
Products of China and formed a cartel.129 As a result, the
Chinese market share on Vitamin C increased and the price
nearly tripled.130 Plaintiffs further alleged that the Chinese
manufacturers met in June 2004 and agreed to raise prices by
shutting down production and restricting exports to the United
States.131 The Chinese defendants argued that comity and the
act-of-state doctrine (a foreign government may not be
questioned in another nation’s courts for actions within its
borders) applied.132 Indeed, the AIEMC was associated with the
Chamber of Commerce of Medicines and Health Products
Importers and Exporters, an entity under the direct control of
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce.133
In June 2006, the Chinese manufacturers sought a stay of
discovery pending their motions to dismiss. They argued that they
were going to secure a dismissal on a theory akin to the act-ofstate doctrine—that they could not be held liable for conduct in
violation of U.S. antitrust laws because the Chinese government
had compelled them to engage in their conduct.134 The Chinese
government then filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that the
Chinese manufacturers were compelled under Chinese law to
collectively set a price for vitamin exports. Trager responded:
“The Chinese government’s appearance as amicus curiae is
unprecedented. It has never before come to the United States as
amicus to present its views. This fact alone demonstrates the
importance the Chinese government places on this case.”135
Nevertheless, Trager reasoned that the documents the
Chinese submitted as attachments to their brief, if credited,
would present a complex interplay between the Chinese
government and the defendants, where defendants’ independence
128

In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 552 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 237 F.R.D. 35, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
130
Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 548-49.
131
Id. at 549.
132
Id. at 550.
133
Id. at 551.
134
Magistrate Judge James Orenstein denied the application to stay
discovery. Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 237 F.R.D. 35.
135
Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
129
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in making pricing decisions was difficult to determine at that
stage in the litigation.136
But in November 2008, Trager rejected the claim by the
Chinese companies to dismiss the case on the grounds that their
price-fixing activities were compelled by the Chinese government.
He held that the record was too ambiguous to foreclose further
inquiry into the voluntariness of defendants’ actions. While the
Ministry brief was entitled to “substantial deference,” it would not
be taken as conclusive evidence of compulsion.137
B.

Copyright

Trager wrote a number of interesting opinions in the
area of copyright law. One was Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v.
IAC/Interactive Corp.138 In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit considered whether registration of a
copyright takes place when the Copyright Office receives a
completed registration application or only after the Copyright
Office issues a certificate of registration. Four courts of appeals
and several district courts had considered the issue and were
divided equally.139 In addition, there was a recent Supreme
Court decision bearing on the issue.140
The Ninth Circuit panel found no guidance from the
language of the relevant clause in the statute or the law as a
whole.141 However, looking at the purpose of the law, the panel
concluded that the application approach better fulfilled
Congress’s purpose to provide broad copyright protection and
maintain a “robust federal register.”142 The Ninth Circuit thus
sided with the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in holding that
receipt by the Copyright Office of a complete application
satisfies the registration requirement.143
136

Id. at 556.
Id. at 557. After Judge Trager’s death, the case was reassigned to Judge
Brian Cogan.
138
606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010).
139
Id. at 615 n.4.
140
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
141
Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617-18.
142
Id. at 618.
143
Id. at 616, 621. One fine Trager opinion written for the Eleventh Circuit on
the question as to whether the Copyright Act accords a magazine a privilege to produce
a digital compilation containing exact images was vacated by an en banc court,
although the latter court reached the same result. Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y,
488 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 497 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2007), rev’d
en banc, 553 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2008). At issue was whether the National Geographic
137
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Extraordinary Rendition

One Trager decision that aroused considerable criticism
involved the extraordinary rendition of a Canadian citizen who
passed through John F. Kennedy Airport while attempting to
catch a connecting flight to Canada.144 Maher Arar, on his way
home from vacationing in Tunisia, was intercepted by American
officials who believed he was a terrorist.145 Detained, Arar was
interrogated, placed in solitary confinement, and given the
opportunity to voluntarily return to Syria (which he refused).146
Arar was permitted only a single meeting with counsel, and was
then branded “clearly and unequivocally a member of al Qaeda,”
flown to Jordan, and turned over to Syrian authorities.147 Neither
the Canadian Consulate nor Arar’s attorney was informed before
he was taken from the United States.148
During his ten-month detention in Syria, Arar was
tortured149 (as Arar warned American officials he would be150).
He was forced to sign a confession stating that he had
participated in terrorist training in Afghanistan, which he later
denied.151 His statements were apparently shared with the
United States government. Ultimately, Syria released Arar,
who returned to Canada.152 Later, Arar—a telecommunications
engineer who held both Syrian and Canadian citizenship—was
completely exonerated by the government of Canada. Seven
Society could release an unedited CD-ROM collection of its back issues without paying
photographers royalties for their work. Trager’s panel and the en banc court held that
the addition of new material to the work—an introductory sequence—did not take the
revised collective work outside the privilege, for other portions were privileged (the
reproduced issues of the magazines themselves (“Replica”) and the computer program
(“program”)).
Trager also handled a large number of copyright-infringement suits
brought by record companies throughout the United States in response to online
distribution. The suits were brought against individuals in an attempt to combat and
deter what record labels perceived as massive copyright infringement over the
Internet. See generally UMG Recordings v. Lindor, CV-05-1095, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20952 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010); Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Torres, No. CV-07-640,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92774 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2007); UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Lindor, 531 F. Supp. 2d 453 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); UMG Recordings v. Lindor, No. CV-051095, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83486 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2006).
144
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252-53 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
145
Id. at 253.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 254.
148
Id. at 252-54.
149
Id. at 254.
150
Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 586 (2d Cir. 2009) (dissenting opinion).
151
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 255.
152
Id.
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months after Trager’s decision on rendition (February 2006),
the Canadian government concluded that Canadian
intelligence, under pressure to find terrorists, had passed on
false warnings about Arar to the United States.153 The 822-page
report of the commission established by the Canadian
government found that Arar had no involvement in Islamic
extremism and was not a security risk.154 The Prime Minister of
Canada sent a letter of apology to Arar and his family along
with payment of approximately $9.75 million.155 In June 2008,
the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security
told a congressional committee that he would not rule out that
U.S. officials had violated U.S. laws.156
In the meantime, Arar brought suit seeking declaratory
relief and compensatory and punitive damages. Having been
removed to Syria under the covert U.S. policy of “extraordinary
rendition,” through which non-U.S. citizens were “sent to
foreign countries to undergo methods of interrogation not
permitted in the United States,”157 Arar alleged that the U.S.
officials had violated (1) the Torture Victim Prevention Act
(TVPA); (2) his Fifth Amendment rights when the defendants
knowingly subjected him to torture and coercive interrogation
in Syria; (3) his Fifth Amendment rights through his arbitrary
and indefinite detention in Syria, including denial of access to
counsel, the courts, and his consulate; and (4) his Fifth
Amendment Rights because he had suffered “outrageous,
excessive, cruel, inhumane and degrading conditions of
confinement in the United States where he had been subjected
to coercive and involuntary custodial interrogation and
deprived of access to lawyers and courts.”158
In the course of a lengthy opinion that resolved many
(but not the most important) issues in a manner favorable to the
plaintiff, Trager awarded no relief. He first held that Arar
lacked standing for declaratory relief because the activity he was
challenging was neither ongoing nor likely to impact him in the
153

Apparently Arar had acquaintances in Canada who were being investigated.
Id. at 256 n.1.
154
The United States refused to cooperate with the Canadian inquiry.
155
Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 2008).
156
Louis Fischer, Extraordinary Rendition, The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L.
REV. 1405, 1441-42 (2008); John R. Crook, Second Circuit Panel Dismisses Canadian
Citizen’s Claims Involving Removal to Syria: Court to Rehear en Banc; U.S. Agencies
Investigate Handling of the Case, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 880, 882 (2008).
157
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 256.
158
Id. at 257-58.
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future.159 Then, after making a series of rulings for Arar
regarding the application of the TVPA, Trager held that because
Congress intended for the Act to be used as a remedy for U.S.
citizens subject to torture overseas, it did not apply in Arar’s
case.160
With respect to compensatory and punitive damages,
the claim for relief was based on the so-called Bivens remedy,
one created by the Supreme Court for federal officials’
violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.161
Once again, Trager resolved the preliminary questions
favorably to Arar but refused to extend Bivens to overseas
conduct because of Congress’s power over aliens and the
“national security and foreign policy decisions at the heart of
this case.”162 Extending Bivens in this sort of case, wrote Trager,
“could significantly disrupt the ability of the political branches
to respond to foreign situations involving our national
interest.”163 Further, Trager believed that most if not all judges
lacked the experience or the background “to adequately and
competently define and adjudge the rights of an individual visà-vis the needs of officials acting to defend the sovereign
interests of the United States.”164 The task of balancing
individual rights against national security concerns was one,
he felt, courts should not take on without the guidance or
authority of the coordinate branches.165 The claim that Arar was
deprived of due process rights during his period of domestic
detention still might, Trager wrote, potentially raise Bivens
claims, but Arar would have to redraft a complaint excluding
the rendition claim and naming the defendants that were
personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional treatment.
That Arar never did.166
Trager’s opinion in Arar was subjected to considerable
criticism. He may have escaped some obloquy had he resolved
159

Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 263.
161
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
162
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
163
Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273-74 (1990)).
164
Id. at 282.
165
Trager denied Arar’s claim of denial of access to counsel and he dismissed
all claims against the individuals without prejudice to repleading Count 4. Id. at 286.
166
The United States had moved for summary judgment in the Arar case,
invoking the state-secrets privilege. Having held for the government on the statutory and
constitutional claims, Trager found the issue involving state secrets moot. Id. at 287.
160
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the case on the basis of the state-secret doctrine, but he
possibly did some good in resolving so many subissues
favorably to Arar. The federal judiciary as a whole did not
cover itself with glory in litigation involving 9/11. This author
wonders about the claim that executive officials, often with
very little experience in dealing with national security matters,
are more up to the task of balancing individual rights against
the claims of national security than experienced judges.
Barbara Olshansky, Deputy Legal Director of the Center for
Constitutional Rights, has put it this way: “There can be little
doubt that every official of the United States [involved in Arar’s
torture] knew that sending him to Syria was a clear violation of
the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and international
law . . . . This is a dark day indeed.”167 A ruling for Arar would
have flown in the face of most of the 9/11 cases and perhaps
such a step would not have been appropriate for a district
judge. At least Trager’s rulings for Arar on the subissues might
have operated as a brake on the executive.
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed Trager’s decision over one dissent.168 Without either
party requesting it, the Second Circuit vacated the panel
opinion, and then, sitting en banc affirmed Trager by a vote of
seven to four.169 Writing for the court, Chief Judge Dennis
Jacobs affirmed Trager as to standing. He dispatched Arar’s
claim under the TVPA more easily than Trager, however.
Judge Jacobs held that to state a claim under the TVPA, there
must be an allegation that U.S. officials possess power under
foreign law and the offending actions must derive from an
exercise of that power.170 On the Bivens claim, the court also
affirmed. While not precluding judicial review and oversight, it
held that if there was to be a civil remedy in damages suffered
in the context of extraordinary rendition, Congress would need
to create such a remedy.171 The Supreme Court denied
167

Nat Hentoff, The Torture Judge, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.C.) (Mar. 7, 2006),
http://www.villagevoice.com/2006-03-07/news/the-torture-judge; see also Jules Lobel,
Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution: The Case of Maher Arar, 28 REV. LITIG.
479 (2008). Lobel was counsel to Arar. See Michael V. Sage, The Exploration of Legal
Loopholes in the Name of National Security: A Case Study on Extraordinary Rendition,
37 CAL. INT’L L.J. 121, 132, 135 (2006).
168
Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
169
Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
170
Id. at 568.
171
Id. at 576. In his dissent, Judge Robert A. Sack found the majority’s
recitation of the facts as “generally accurate, but anodyne.” He then stated that “[t]he
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certiorari.172 The treatment of the Arar case by all three tiers of
the federal judiciary was of a piece with the approach of all
three branches of the U.S. government to refuse to be held
accountable for torture after 9/11.
D.

United States v. Nelson

The most publicized decision of Judge Trager’s career
was connected to boiling racial tensions in his home borough,
Brooklyn. On August 19, 1991, an automobile driven by a
Hasidic Jew struck two black children in Brooklyn’s Crown
Heights; one of the children was killed.173 Rumors swiftly spread
that the ambulance driver at the scene had treated the Hasid
ahead of the children.174 A riot occurred. Eleven AfricanAmericans—including a defendant, Lemrick Nelson Jr.—
chased Yankel Rosenbaum, an orthodox Jew, and stabbed him
to death.175 Nelson, then sixteen, was found with a bloody knife
and was positively identified by the victim before he died.176
Nelson and Charles Price, who had harangued the crowd, were
charged with second-degree murder and acquitted in state
court.177 Bitter feelings between the Jewish and AfricanAmerican communities festered.
Nelson moved to Georgia where he got into more
trouble.178 He pleaded guilty, as an adult, to aggravated assault
and carrying a concealed weapon.179 The U.S. Attorney for the
district court’s opinion carefully and fully sets forth Arar’s allegations.” Id. at 582, 584
(Sack, J., dissenting).
Judge Trager also had before him a rather different case involving
terrorism. This was a suit brought by a family who were dual citizens of the United
States and Israel, who sued a Swiss financial institution with offices in the United
States and Israel over the death of their husband/father who was killed in Israel in a
bus blown up by terrorists. The plaintiffs claimed that the bank (UBS AG) had
provided financial services for the alleged terrorist organization, Hamas. In September
2009, Judge Charles P. Sifton dealt with issues of standing, forum non conveniens, and
motions to dismiss. Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). After
Sifton’s death in November 2009, the case was assigned to Trager who denied motions
for reconsideration of the forum non conveniens issue and to certify Sifton’s order for
interlocutory appeal. Goldberg v. UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d 92 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
172
Arar v. Ashcroft, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).
173
United States v. Nelson, 90 F.3d 636, 637 (2d Cir. 1996).
174
Id. at 637-38.
175
Id. at 638.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 640.
179
United States v. Nelson, 921 F. Supp. 105, 108 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 90 F.3d
636 (2d Cir. 1996).
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Eastern District of New York charged Nelson, then nineteen,
with juvenile delinquency over Rosenbaum’s death. Five days
after the information was filed, the government moved to
transfer Nelson to criminally prosecute him as an adult for
violation of Rosenbaum’s civil rights. Trager denied the order
but was reversed by the Second Circuit. The appellate court
held that Trager had improperly evaluated the strength of the
government’s evidence and erred by not considering Nelson’s
age at the time of the transfer (minimizing the seriousness of
the offense), by using a “glimmer-of-hope” test to determine the
possibility of Nelson’s rehabilitation, and by not making any
inquiry into juvenile programs available for someone of
Nelson’s age.180 The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded to
Trager for further findings and reconsideration.
Before the hearing on remand, Nelson had been charged
with resisting arrest and criminal trespass. The latter had
occurred when he refused to leave the federal courthouse. In
his opinion on remand, Trager granted the motion to transfer
because of the seriousness of the crime charged as well as the
finding that “it [was] not ‘likely’ that Nelson would be
rehabilitated.”181 This time the decision was upheld by the
Court of Appeals.182 Trager wanted to avoid turning the Nelson
trial into a proceeding as racially divisive as Rodney King’s had
been in Los Angeles. He intended to empanel “a moral jury that
render[ed] a verdict that ha[d] moral integrity.”183 However, an
important Supreme Court decision, Batson v. Kentucky,184 stood
in his way. Batson held that peremptory strikes on the basis of
race violate the Equal Protection Clause.185 That case and its
progeny were primarily aimed at lawyers, but presumably
bound judges as well.
Presiding over jury selection in the Nelson case, Trager
denied the defendant’s for-cause challenge of a Jewish juror
(Juror 108) who had doubted his ability to be objective.186 Then,
when an African-American juror was excused, the Judge did
not replace the juror with the first alternate juror but rather
180
181
182
183

United States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583 (2d Cir. 1995).
Nelson, 921 F. Supp. at 122.
Id.
United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting trial

transcript).
184
185
186

476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id.
Nelson, 277 F.3d at 172.
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sua sponte removed a second white juror from the panel and
filled the two spaces with an African-American juror and Juror
108.187 The resulting jury, which included three AfricanAmericans and two Jews, convicted both men. Trager
sentenced Nelson to 235 months and Price to 262 months.188
On appeal, much of Judge Guido Calabrisi’s lengthy
opinion revolved around the application of the Civil Rights Act
to the Nelson case. But in dealing with Trager’s race- and
religion-based shuffling, the court held that Juror 108 had been
improperly seated because he had revealed sufficient bias
during the voir dire.189 Further, the consent given to his
selection by the attorneys was invalid because it was obtained
in exchange for the improper empanelling of a jury chosen
partly on the basis of race.190 Even though the defendants had
improperly consented to the scheme,
where the trier of fact in a criminal trial is a biased jury that
resulted from a district court’s erroneous failure to grant a for-cause
challenge to an actually biased juror whose bias was revealed at the
voir dire, we question whether a defendant can subsequently waive
his claim . . . to be tried before an impartial fact finder.191

Even though “the motives behind the district court’s race- and
religion-based jury selection procedures were undoubtedly
meant to be tolerant and inclusive . . . that fact cannot justify
the district court’s race-conscious actions.”192
Dissenting in part, Judge Chester J. Straub, though
troubled about the jury selection, would have affirmed, but
noted the court’s willingness to vacate such efforts in the
future. As for the Nelson case, Straub said, “When one
considers the overall circumstances and conditions of this trial,
we can have overwhelming confidence in the fairness and
validity of its verdict.”193
Thus, Trager was reprimanded for an “activist” solution
intended to avoid divisiveness and reach a “moral” result.

187

Id.
Id. at 173.
189
Id. at 203-04.
190
Id. at 208, 210.
191
Id. at 206.
192
Id. at 207.
193
Id. at 217, 220. Eight years after the appeal in the Nelson case, Trager filed
an opinion explaining why he had not recused himself from the case. United States v.
Nelson, No. CR-94-823, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63814 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010).
188
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III.

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS CASES

A.

Section 1983 and More Modern Statutory Civil Rights
Cases

While Trager was not a notable enthusiast for
workplace-based claims under sections 1981194 and 1983,195
plaintiffs did not fare too badly in cases before him.196 Trager
granted summary judgment against British Airways in a Title
VII action. The plaintiff, Elizabeth de Chanval Pellier, claimed
that after she was promoted to duty-maintenance manager (a
middle-level management position) at John F. Kennedy
Airport, other employees engaged in inappropriate sexual
conduct, including the posting of pornographic material
directed specifically at Pellier.197 Because the airline did not
effectively respond to her complaints, Pellier ultimately had to
accept a position with fewer material responsibilities in order
to escape the intolerable conditions.
Trager found that Pellier’s transfer was not an “adverse
employment action because she [had] voluntarily requested
and accepted it.”198 However, he did find that Pellier had a
triable claim of hostile work environment.199 British Airways
argued that Pellier had engaged in conduct similar to that of
which she was complaining: “over-exuberant hugging and
kissing,” sexually explicit conversations, and—during her work
history at the airlines—“intimate relations” with two British
Airways employees (one of whom she later became engaged
to).200 Yet, the judge found the consensual relations
“irrelevant.”201 “Even if . . . Pellier was comfortable with certain
194

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006) (protecting the rights of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States to, among other things, make and enforce contracts
and entitling them to the full and equal benefit of laws for the security of persons and
properties as enjoyed by white citizens).
195
Id. § 1983 (providing the remedy for deprivation of federal constitutional
and statutory rights when violated under color of state law).
196
On the other hand, see Barney v. Consolidated Edison Co., No. CV-99-823,
2009 WL 6551494 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2009), where Judge Trager granted summary
judgment against a former Consolidated Edison employee who sued under Title VII
and section 1981; see also Vinson v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., No. CY-01-6900, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3943 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2006).
197
Pellier v. British Airways, PLC, No. Civ.A. 02-CV-4195, 2006 WL 132073,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2006).
198
Id. at *4.
199
Id. at *15.
200
Id. at *7.
201
Id.
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sexual behavior in the workplace, a reasonable jury need not
conclude that she was thereby comfortable . . . [with] being
singled out by an all-male staff as the lone target of sexually
explicit materials.”202 He later granted summary judgment to the
defendant for the sex-discrimination claim, but denied it as to the
retaliation and hostile-environment claims. Trager evidenced no
lack of sympathy for the defendant in this situation.
Trager also held for the plaintiff in a case involving the
New York City Transit Authority. For promotion to the position
of subway station supervisor, the authority required an EKG
test if the candidate had a problematic medical history and was
over forty.203 The plaintiff challenged the policy under the Age
and Discrimination in Employment Act. Trager refused to
accept the defendant’s bona fide occupational-qualification
defense. As he wrote, practically and with wit,
To put the question sharply, what exactly would happen if a Station
Supervisor, Level I were to suffer an unexpected heart attack? While
such an event would unquestionably be more than a small
inconvenience to the individual himself . . . there is no indication in
this record that a great danger would befall either the TA’s
operations or the general public.204

In another case, Trager clearly was greatly disturbed by
the narrative of Lawrence Hardy’s section 1983 suit.205 Hardy,
an ex-convict who had served a four-year sentence for robbery,
was arrested for violating parole. He then sued under section
1983. The heart of the section 1983 action, discussed by Trager
in thirty-four pages of the Federal Supplement, was the New
York City Department of Corrections’ deliberate indifference to
Hardy’s very serious ear infection.
As Trager told the story, Hardy’s ear infection had been
causing him pain and dizziness prior to his arrest. The
defendants’ gross negligence magnified the symptoms, and a
golf-ball-sized swelling grew from Hardy’s neck.206 From there,
the symptoms developed into extreme pain, blurred vision,
202

Id. at *8 (citation omitted).
Epter v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 127 F. Supp. 2d 384, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
After winning the lawsuit and getting the transit authority to change its policy, Epter
was promoted to station supervisor, but then asked to be returned to his old position.
Judge Trager awarded back pay damages and attorneys’ fees to Epter but held that
liquidated damages were not appropriate. Epter v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 216 F. Supp.
2d 131, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
204
Epter, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 391-92.
205
Hardy v. City of New York, 732 F. Supp. 2d 112, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
206
Id. at 118.
203
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discharge from the ear, and hearing loss.207 Within eight weeks,
Hardy had difficulty walking and standing as the swelling in
his neck grew to the size of a tennis ball with pus emanating
from his ear in a constant flow.208 Only then was Hardy seen by
a specialist and a mastoidectomy performed.209 The operation
was but a partial success as a staph infection developed.210 A
little more than two months after the operation, Hardy was
released from custody and admitted immediately to Manhattan
Eye and Ear Hospital.211 Diagnosed with a life-threatening
infection, Hardy survived but ended up in a nursing home
where he eventually lost hearing in one ear.212
Trager dismissed Hardy’s action against the New York
State defendants on Eleventh Amendment grounds and
dismissed claims of deliberate indifference against some of the
officers.213 However, Trager preserved claims against some of
the defendants at the Downstate Correctional Center, as well
as a nurse, a physician, and correction officers at the Willard
Drug Treatment Center.214
B.

Social Security Disability Appeals

By the time David Trager ascended to the bench, the
“war” the federal judiciary had fought with the Social Security
Administration was over. Under political pressure, bureaucrats
and administrative law judges had in the 1980s denied large
numbers of applicants’ benefits and had thrown many recipients
of benefits off the payroll. Federal judges of all judicial
persuasions had been remanding cases to the agency.215 The
battle had waned by the time Trager was appointed. Judge
Trager generally upheld agency determinations without
publication of opinions. There was, however, one case where he
granted judgment on the pleadings and awarded ten years of
disability retroactively.

207

Id. at 119.
Id. at 120.
209
Id. at 122.
210
Id. at 123.
211
Id. at 124.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 127-28.
214
Id. at 145-46.
215
See JEFFREY B. MORRIS, ESTABLISHING JUSTICE IN MIDDLE AMERICA 27172 (2007); MORRIS, supra note 60, at 188-89.
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Irene Rooney was denied benefits for her disabilities
three times.216 Fifty-nine years old, she had been a reliable
employee for thirty-three years but suffered from progressive
asthmatic disorder, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
bronchitis, and arrhythmia.217 She was also in considerable pain
due to degenerative disc disease and chronic spinal strain. She
was also blind in one eye.218
In 1987, Rooney filed an application for disability
benefits.219 Denied benefits initially and on reconsideration, she
received a notice from the Department of Health and Human
Services informing her that she had sixty days to request a
hearing if she believed that the determination was incorrect.220
The notice stated that if she did not request a hearing she
could still file another application at any time.221 Nothing in the
notice informed her that not requesting a hearing would mean
permanent loss of her opportunity to claim substantial benefits
up to the time of the new claim. There was nothing giving her
notice of the consequences of electing not to have a hearing.
From 1987 until 1991, Rooney, unaware that
reapplication was not the same as requesting a hearing, filed
two applications—both denied.222 However, by 1991, the agency’s
notice of reconsideration had changed and warned about the
adverse effect of failing to appeal.223 Proceeding with counsel, she
finally requested a hearing during which she sought to open the
previous denials.224 When the administrative law judge refused to
pursue the issue, Rooney appealed to the district court.225
Even though the decision not to reopen an adjudicated
claim is generally not reviewable by the courts, Trager found a
violation of procedural due process. Writing that the record was
“somewhat muddied,”226 Trager stated that the notice Rooney
had been given was “almost deliberately crafted to divert the
lay person from a timely appeal.”227 The record in Rooney’s case,
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

Rooney v. Shalala, 879 F. Supp. 252, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 256.
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Trager wrote, was “a testament to inattention and disregard.”228
Rather than remand the case, Trager sympathized with
Rooney, “a fifty-year old woman with a litany of impairments
who had worked hard all her life.” He went on to describe the
record as devoid of “malingering” and with a “remarkable
number of procedural and evidentiary errors.”229 In turn, Judge
Trager directly awarded ten years of disability benefits to her
without a remand.230
C.

Immigration, Deportation, and Extradition Matters

Judge Trager held for the government in most of the
immigration, deportation, and extradition matters before him.231
One case, though, is worth brief scrutiny partly because of its
lengthy, thorough opinion holding that an indictment for
illegally entering the country was unlawful because the
underlying deportation had been unlawful.232 The case is worth
further scrutiny because of what this observer reads as a
particular sympathy for the defendant.
Richard Garcia-Jurado, a Colombian, had come to the
United States as a legal permanent resident to join his mother,
who was then a legal permanent resident and later became a
U.S. citizen.233 Garcia-Jurado’s family in the U.S. included his
brother and sister, stepfather, and half-sister (who were U.S.
citizens), and his brother and older sister who were legal
permanent residents.234 Further, he had a long-tem relationship
with a legal permanent resident with whom he had a
daughter.235 In 1993, Garcia-Jurado pleaded guilty to possession
228

Id. at 261.
Id. at 258, 261-62.
230
Id. at 262.
231
See, e.g., Guang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., No. CV-02-5916,
2005 WL 465436 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2005) (rejecting habeas corpus petition attempting
to block removal to China where rejection of asylum claim was correct); Echendu v.
United States, No. CV-02-1255, 3003 WL 21653370, at *1, *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2003)
(denying writ of coram nobis to prospective deportee who alleged ineffectiveness of
counsel where he was convicted of knowingly failing to appear in court in a case where
he was acquitted); Lo Duca v. United States, No. CV-95-713, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21155 (E.D.N.Y. July 12, 1995) (upholding legality of extradition order by Magistrate
Judge; extradition request and supporting documentation timely; questions of
sufficiency of extradition documents both beyond the scope of review of petition for
habeas corpus, but also sufficient on the merits).
232
United States v. Garcia-Jurado, 281 F. Supp. 2d 498, 515 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
233
Id. at 500.
234
Id.
235
Id.
229
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of a controlled substance.236 For that, he was sentenced to four to
twelve years in prison—which he used to complete his GED and
earn two vocational training certificates.237 At his deportation
hearing, Garcia-Jurado indicated that he would seek
discretionary relief under section 212(c) of the Immigration and
Naturalization Law.238 However, the immigration judge
inaccurately told him that he was not entitled to seek a
discretionary waiver of deportation.239 Somehow—and Judge
Trager ignored this part of the story—Garcia-Jurado returned to
the United States four years later and was arrested for criminal
possession of marijuana.240 Charged with illegally reentering the
United States after deportation, an aggravated felony, the
defendant came before Judge Trager.241
Trager’s reading of the facts led him to the position that
Garcia-Jurado had been deported before his administrative
proceedings had ended and “before the deadline for judicial review
had passed.”242 After considerable effort, Trager found that the
immigration judge’s error in failing to provide Garcia-Jurado with
a section 212(c) hearing “was a procedural error that rendered the
[previous] proceedings fundamentally unfair.”243 The loss of a
212(c) hearing supported a collateral attack.244 That, in turn, led to
Trager’s holding, “Because Garcia-Jurado was deprived of [his
right to] judicial review . . . his deportation was fundamentally
unfair.”245 Trager concluded the opinion with what could be viewed
as a letter of recommendation:
Garcia-Jurado claims that he would have been a good candidate for a
§ 212(c) waiver of deportation. Indeed, he would. Garcia-Jurado had
lived here since he was a teenager. He has strong family ties in this
country: a mother, stepfather and two half-sisters who are United
States citizens. He also has two other siblings who are legal
permanent residents, and, importantly, a daughter who is a citizen.
He attended high school here, was employed for a year prior to his
arrest. He also received a GED and vocational training in prison,

236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 501.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 506-07.
Id. at 512.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 514.
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and was employed as a machine operator after his release from
prison up to the time he was deported.246

D.

Dean v. United States

In the case of Dean v. United States, Judge Trager found
a clear injustice and ordered the government to correct an
arrest record—an unusual remedy.247 The case involved the
arrest of a school-bus driver for public lewdness in a national
park.248 Dean had been arrested, read his Miranda rights,
photographed, and fingerprinted.249 Dean alleged that, at the
time of his arrest, one of the officers at the police station had
advised him not to involve an attorney. Rather, if he just paid
the fine, the officer stated, “the incident would fall off [his]
record in a few years.”250 Dean had promptly mailed in the form
he was given and paid the eighty-dollar fine.251
Twelve years later Dean’s arrest showed up in a
background check for renewal of his commercial driver’s
license.252 The payment of the fine was treated as a guilty plea.
As a result, under state law, Dean was unable to continue his
employment as a school-bus driver.253
Dean attempted first to have his fingerprints record
expunged on the ground that his criminal record had made it
difficult for him to secure employment. Trager held that “such
relief [could] not be granted under the circumstances.”254 Dean
tried using habeas corpus to achieve the same end. Trager
treated the petition as one for coram nobis, a challenge to
invalidate convictions after the sentence has been served, and
appeared ready to grant that writ.255 Instead, though, he
directed the government to, within thirty days, produce the
form upon which Dean allegedly pleaded guilty.256

246

Id. at 515.
418 F. Supp. 2d 149, 157-58 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
248
Id. at 151.
249
Dean v. United States, No. 05-CV-1496, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40903, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005).
250
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
251
Id. at *2.
252
Id.
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Id.
254
Dean v. United States, No. 04-MC-299, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30062, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2004).
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Dean, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40903, at *4.
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The government was unable to locate the document but,
attempting to comply with the order, submitted the “violation
notice” form used by the U.S. Park Police at the time of Dean’s
arrest. “The word ‘guilty’ did not appear on the face of [that]
notice.”257 Trager was troubled because Dean had not in any
way been informed of the legal consequences he might suffer if
he paid the fine. Trager held that Dean should have been
warned of the consequences of his guilty plea—that payment of
the fine was acceptance of a federal conviction.258 Without that
warning, Dean could not have knowingly waived his rights.259
Trager rejected the government’s argument that
“allowing a litigant to challenge a petty offense conviction” in
this manner “would potentially call into question every petty
offense and misdemeanor.”260 “It appears,” Trager wrote, “that
the government—and perhaps the courts are complicit—wants
to have the ‘benefit’ of a criminal conviction for a large number
of petty offenses without the burden of providing appropriate
procedural protection.”261 Trager made it clear that, if the
government wanted to treat this sort of collateral forfeiture as
a criminal penalty, then to satisfy constitutional concerns, “the
individual must be given clear notice that payment of the fine
constitutes a guilty plea resulting in a conviction of a petty
federal offense and be informed of the right to retain counsel.”262
With regard to the coram nobis petition,263 Trager held
for the plaintiff even though there was “an extremely stringent
standard applied to orders to change arrest and conviction
records.” He granted coram nobis relief, directing the
government to complete Dean’s record with “a clarification
reflecting that he was not convicted of a crime.”264

257

Dean v. United States, 418 F. Supp. 2d 149, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 155-56.
259
Id.
260
Id. at 156.
261
Id.
262
Id. at 157.
263
Id. at 152.
264
Id. at 157. In a later opinion, Trager granted the government the authority to
depose Dean on whether he had been aware of the conviction so that it could show that
the petition was not timely. Otherwise he rejected the government’s petition for
reconsideration. Dean v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 2d 485 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). But see
Grunberg v. Bd. of Educ., No. CV-00-4124, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22424 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
30, 2006).
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Funding for the Profoundly Disabled and Medically
Fragile

David Trager was no “wooly headed dreamer.”
Throughout his career, Trager sought solutions that were
practical and just. That was, perhaps, why he pursued the
course he did in the Lemrick Nelson case. But Judge Trager’s
passion was closest to the surface in a litigation he handled over
the residential placement of seriously disabled young adults.
To some, this litigation was just a lawsuit that
attempted to pry money from the overburdened fiscs of the
State and its cities and counties. New York incurred a large
financial burden from treating and housing the severely
disabled; residential placements were absolutely necessary for
them. When no satisfactory placements existed within the
state, out-of-state placements had to be made, and New York
split expenses with its cities and counties.265 Federal funds had
eased the financial burden, but individuals were not eligible for
funding after the age of twenty one.266
In 1992, arrangements were made wherein New York
agreed to share 50 percent of the expense of out-of-state
placement until suitable in-state institutions were located.267 In
1994, New York enacted a statute that increased state payments
to localities and scheduled the phase-out of out-of-state
placements and the out-of-state recompensation provision.
In 1994, New York City pulled out of the arrangements
because of budgetary pressure. During the first half of 1995,
the State attempted to place recipients of Transitional Care
Funding (TCF) in state facilities with some success. In
February of that year, lawsuits were brought by parents and
guardians of TCF recipients to prohibit New York City and
New York State from terminating transitional care. The suits
were unsuccessful.268 Then, over the Fourth of July weekend,
the State attempted to transfer some of the deeply disturbed

265

Brooks v. Pataki, 908 F. Supp. 1142, 1144 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, Brooks
v. Giuliani, 84 F.3d 1454 (2d Cir. 1996).
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
N.Y. Council for Exceptional People v. Pataki, No. 102684/95 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., Apr. 10, 1995); N.Y. Council for Exceptional People v. Pataki, No. 102684/95 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., June 13, 1995), aff’d, 632 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep’t 1995). On February 20,
1996, the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.
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individuals without the permission, or even notification, of
their parents/guardians.269 The result was somewhat of a fiasco.
A federal action was brought by eighteen of the disabled
young adults, and eight others sought to intervene.270 They were
asking for a preliminary injunction requiring the state to take
all necessary steps to maintain the placements until an orderly
transition to permanent, state-approved placements was
accomplished.
As is often the case with judicial opinions, the manner
in which the facts are stated presage the ultimate conclusion of
law and give a clue to the impact the case has had upon the
judge. This is the first paragraph of Judge Trager’s opinion in
Brooks v. Pataki, the first lawsuit involving the funding: “This
case concerns the care and treatment of about fifty profoundly
disabled and medically fragile individuals whose rights under
the federal Constitution have been gravely imperiled as the
result of an unfortunate funding dispute between the City and
State of New York.”271
In the following paragraph, Trager vividly illustrates
the “victims” in the dispute:
[O]ne is a twenty-six old woman who has epilepsy and an IQ of about
70-72 as well as other disabilities. Another is a twenty-five year old,
profoundly retarded . . . woman. Seven of the eight proposed
intervenors are profoundly autistic and pose potential danger,
certainly, to themselves and, possibly to others.272

Six months later in a different lawsuit over the same issues
with similar plaintiffs, Trager wrote:
It is important to understand just how profoundly disabled plaintiffs
are. TCF recipients are not likely candidates for deinstitutionalization. For instance, plaintiff Lora Hoops, aged twentyfive, diagnosed as functioning in the profound range of mental
retardation, with cerebral palsy and a seizure disorder has been at
The Woods School, in Langhorne, Pennsylvania, since she was
placed there by a Suffolk County local school district nineteen years
ago, at the age of six.273

In the suit involving Westchester County funding, Trager
quoted from a description of plaintiff Jason Goodhue, age
269

Brooks, 908 F. Supp. at 1160 & n.2.
Id. at 1143.
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Id.
272
Id. at 1143-44 (citations omitted).
273
Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v. Pataki, 924 F. Supp. 431, 437
(E.D.N.Y. 1996).
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twenty three, who had “a diagnosis of severe mental
retardation, cerebral palsy, spastic diplegia, functional
scoliosis, . . . encephalopathy and a seizure disorder. He uses a
wheel chair which [he] is able to push independently, though
his control is poor. He is nonverbal, understands simple
commands and usually responds yes/no verbally to questions.”274
In considering whether to grant the preliminary
injunction in the New York City case, Trager focused on claims
of due process—claims which had not been finally adjudicated
in the State’s case. Trager found the constitutional standard in
a Second Circuit decision, Society for Good Will to Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Cuomo,275 and deemed the State’s procedure
“manifestly unprofessional.”276 According to Trager, the episode
on the Fourth of July was “an unconstitutional violation of the
rights of these individuals that threatened them with
irreparable harm.”277 Trager offered an analogy to a State’s or
Congress’s decision to end support for a dialysis program:
Such a program is not an entitlement; there is no custody of the
patient for state action purposes; and the program’s elimination is
within the discretion of a State or Congress. Still, no one would
seriously argue that the Due Process Clause does not impose an
obligation upon a State or Congress to provide reasonable notice to
dialysis recipients before terminating funding for those who have
relied on that life-sustaining program, so as to allow them the
opportunity to obtain alternate access to treatment.278

Trager denied the State’s motion to stay the judgment. In
that opinion, he made clear that the funding was not an
entitlement. Rather, once the State undertook to provide
residential care for individuals, it was obligated to provide
“necessary safe conditions and freedom from undue restraint
determined by the exercise of professional judgment.”279 Having
failed to make appropriate in-state placements, the State could
not abruptly leave these severely disabled individuals “stranded
in placements when the City [terminated its] funding.”280
A few months later, Suffolk County followed New York
City in withdrawing from the State program. Now Trager had
274
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a companion case. In Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v.
Pataki,281 Trager granted a preliminary injunction ordering
Suffolk County to resume funding for six months “so as to
provide . . . the opportunity to arrange alternative care in an
orderly manner.”282 The State indicated it would “reimburse the
county for sixty percent of the cost” and was ordered to
“assume the burden of funding any remaining TCF placements
at the end of the six-month period.”283 Just about one month
later he denied the County’s request for a stay pending appeal.
Westchester County then withdrew from the state
program, providing Trager with a third case.284 The Westchester
case posed the same issues as the Suffolk case.285 However, the
Westchester case came down after the U.S. Court of Appeals had
remanded the New York City case. As will be seen shortly,
Trager was unable to rest on the Due Process Clause any longer.
Instead, he based his decision in the Westchester case on the
Equal Protection Clause, holding that the County had violated
equal protection by granting protections to persons
institutionalized in-state that the TCF recipients (out-of-state)
did not have.286 Trager held that the TCF statute lacked a
rational basis.287 Trager also held that the State failed to offer
procedural due process.288 As a result, three weeks after the
Court of Appeals had vacated Trager’s decision in the New York
City case, Trager granted the Westchester plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction against the County defendants. The
State was ordered to, among other things, continue to pay for
the out-of-state facilities where plaintiffs were still residing.289
However, Trager stayed the injunction based upon the stay the
Court of Appeals had ordered in the Suffolk case.
However, as has already been intimated, three weeks
before the first Westchester decision the Court of Appeals, by a
two to one vote, rained on Trager’s parade. The panel majority
vacated the injunction in the New York City case and remanded
281
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it to Trager.290 The appellate court held that the plaintiffs’
claims were barred by res judicata. The court also held that the
defendants had no duty under the Due Process Clause to
provide professional care to plaintiffs and no duty to resume
payments for the plaintiffs’ out-of-state placements.291 The
Court of Appeals also held that the “July Fourth weekend
episode amounted to a breach of the State defendants’ duty to
ensure that the involuntary transfers were constitutionally
appropriate, but that this injunction [was] not the appropriate
remedy for this breach.”292 Barrington Parker dissented from
the Court of Appeals decision. He would not have “disturbed
Trager’s conclusions that there [were] sufficiently serious
questions regarding the risk of further abuse of the plaintiffs’
substantive due process rights, and that the balance of
hardships tip[ped] decidedly in plaintiffs’ favor.”293
The parties in Brooks v. Pataki reached an agreement
whereby the State would continue to provide the requested funds
and the case was administratively closed on May 11, 2000.294
In the handling of the litigation involving the mentally
disabled, David Trager sounded and acted more like his
colleague, Jack B. Weinstein, than one might expect. In a letter
written while the litigation was still alive, Trager commented,
“As a non-believer in entitlements, I found myself developing a
purely procedural due process theory to justify judicial
intervention in a fact pattern that cried out for relief.”295
One of the opinions in the Suffolk County case indicated
how far Judge Trager, no judicial activist by philosophy, traveled
in the mental health litigation: “The role of the judiciary to review
executive and legislative actions and to protect the rights of
persons unable to protect themselves from unconstitutional
governmental intrusion has long been recognized.”296
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CONCLUSION
It is premature to assess a judicial career of seventeen
years that only ended this year. Much of what a district judge does
is not found in the judge’s opinions. One would, for example, have
loved to have been a fly on the wall observing this larger-than-life
personality conduct settlement negotiations. Unfortunately, there
is limited coverage of Trager’s work in newspapers. However, the
potential availability of the oral history Trager created during the
last year of his life will enrich our knowledge of his work and—
hopefully over time—interviews of his clerks, colleagues, and
friends will provide a more definitive account of the work of not
just a very able judge, but a man whose career as a whole stands
as a model of how a single lawyer can benefit society.
But some observations of Trager, as judge, may be
permitted at this time. Although Trager was a strong and
unforgettable personality, as a judge, he clearly did not seek the
spotlight. His opinions could be analytically complex, but his
prose is almost always straightforward. A man, who in person
could be extraordinarily amusing, rejected wit in judicial opinions.
Trager’s career certainly demonstrates the breadth of the
work of contemporary federal judges. Indeed, this author lacked
the time and space to discuss Trager’s handling of threshold
matters (standing, ripeness, etc.). Nor did I discuss interesting
Trager opinions in trademarks, commercial law, torts, and
attorney dealings. The particular federal specialties that offered
Trager the richest opportunities were antitrust and copyright. As
one might have expected, Trager demonstrated marked ability in
criminal cases both as a district and a court of appeals judge.
Indeed, Trager penned for three U.S. Courts of Appeals; he would
have distinguished himself as an appellate judge, had that job
fallen to him. On the other hand, the district bench offered him
constant interactions with others, something Trager loved.
A moderate and careful judge who abjured grandiloquence,
Trager’s emotions could be deeply engaged by his cases. That
clearly was true in the mental health cases, the Dean case, and,
probably, in other cases of injustice, such as befell Irene Rooney
and Lawrence Hardy. In the case involving Lemrick Nelson,
Trager was engaged in attempting to achieve in a different way a
result which would ease rather than raise the simmering tensions
of a divided city. David Trager was no “bleeding heart,” but he
cared deeply for the community to which he had devoted his public
life. And for them, he was a judge who was willing to take risks.

